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THE ROBERTS COURT AND WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH* AND APRIL SANFORD** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
According to the Death Penalty Information Center, Joe D’Ambrosio 
became the 140th person in the United States to be exonerated and released 
from death row since 1973 when state and federal courts barred his re-
prosecution in January 2012.1 Because of court decisions castigating 
prosecutors for concealing evidence that could have led to his acquittal at trial, 
D’Ambrosio was released in 2010 after spending twenty-one years on death 
row.2 Yet, he had to wait until 2012 for federal appellate courts to finally reject 
prosecutors’ efforts to retry him for a 1988 murder.3 As with the cases of other 
exonerated individuals released from prison,4 the media coverage of the 
D’Ambrosio case served as yet another reminder of the regularity with which 
errors in the justice process send innocent people to prison for murder or other 
lesser charges.5 
 
* Professor of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University. A.B., Harvard University, 1980; 
M.Sc., University of Bristol (U.K.), 1981; J.D., University of Tennessee, 1984 ; Ph.D., University 
of Connecticut, 1988. 
** Social Worker, Detroit Police Department. B.A., Michigan State University, 2005; M.A., 
Arizona State University, 2008; M.S.W., University of Illinois-Chicago, 2010. 
Note: The views expressed in this article represent those of the authors and not their employing 
organizations. 
 1. Innocence Cases: 2004-Present, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpen 
altyinfo.org/innocence-cases-2004-present#142 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
 2. Peter Krouse, Joe D’Ambrosio, Once on Death Row on Murder Charge, Now Free After 
Judge Dismisses All Charges, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Mar. 6, 2010, 4:51 PM), http://blog. 
cleveland.com/metro/2010/03/d.html. 
 3. Pat Galbincea, U.S. Supreme Court Closes Case Against Joe D’Ambrosio for Murder, 
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER (Jan. 25, 2012, 8:08 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2012/01/ 
us_supreme_court_closes_23-yea.html. 
 4. See, e.g., Janet Roberts & Elizabeth Stanton, A Long Road Back After Exoneration, and 
Justice Is Slow to Make Amends, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
11/25/us/25dna.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (overview description of post-release experiences of 
more than 200 innocent people released from prison through DNA testing from 1989 to 2007). 
 5. Scholars estimate that erroneous convictions do not arise in the rare individual case, but 
constitute a regularly-occurring percentage of the cases processed in the system. See Marvin 
Zalman, An Integrated Justice Model of Wrongful Convictions, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1465, 1519 
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Wrongful convictions can be produced through a myriad of causes, from 
“the presentation of false, mistaken, or misleading evidence to juries”6 to 
“confused jurors, overzealous prosecutors, and incompetent defense counsel,”7 
and, thus, there is no simple cure for the problem. Yet, as stated by Andrew 
Siegel, “the nature of these problems and their frequency can be dramatically 
affected by the rules, incentives, norms, and directions impressed upon the 
individuals who serve as rotating parts in the criminal justice machine.”8 As a 
result, Siegel’s observation points to the potential for the U.S. Supreme Court 
to help reduce the problem of erroneous convictions through its role as an 
authoritative, rule-making institution that can affect incentives, norms, and 
directives as a result of its interpretations of the U.S. Constitution and relevant 
statutes.9 
The Supreme Court defines rules that affect the reliability of decisions in 
criminal cases.10 Some of these rules diminish risks of erroneous convictions.11 
Other rules, unfortunately, serve to exacerbate those risks and contribute to 
unjust outcomes.12 This article will examine the Roberts Court and what it has 
done, failed to do, or could do to reduce the risk of erroneous convictions. 
There is no claim here that the Supreme Court can ensure that decisions in 
criminal cases are accurate, reliable, and free from the risk of error.13 Many 
discretionary decisions by victims, witnesses, police, prosecutors, judges, and 
jurors are simply beyond the control of the Supreme Court and its rule-making 
 
(2010) (“If, as noted earlier, factually innocent defendants are convicted in 0.5 percent to 1 
percent of all felony convictions in the United States, this indicates a flawed system.”). 
 6. Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A Proposal for a Third 
Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 
1224 (2005). 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 
367–71 (4th ed. 1993) (describing the important impact of Supreme Court decisions on law 
enforcement rules and practices). 
 10. For example, by enabling states to require that appellants accept representation by 
counsel in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, the Supreme Court sought to ensure that 
appellate courts’ decisions benefit from the expert preparation and professional presentation of 
attorneys rather than the uncertain offerings of pro se litigants. 528 U.S. 152 (2000). 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding defendants are entitled to 
presence of counsel at any post-indictment, identification lineup). 
 12. See, e.g., Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (finding no violation of due 
process when police fail to preserve evidence unless defendant can prove that police acted in bad 
faith in destroying or failing to preserve evidence). 
 13. The Supreme Court has a limited ability to make sure that its rules are followed. See 
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 209–39 (4th ed. 1992) (describing the myriad ways 
that officials in government and the justice system can resist, misunderstand, or disobey decisions 
by the Supreme Court). 
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authority.14 However, the Supreme Court can and should do more to protect 
against erroneous convictions. 
II.  THE SUPREME COURT AND ATTITUDES ABOUT INJUSTICE 
The Roberts Court era began with the appointment of Chief Justice John 
Roberts in 2005 to replace the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist.15 Chief 
Justice Roberts’ voting patterns are similar to those of Rehnquist, the justice 
for whom Roberts had worked as a law clerk soon after graduating from law 
school.16 Since the appointment of Roberts, there have been three additional 
newcomers appointed to the Court.17 The Rehnquist Court era saw deep 
divisions among the justices on many issues.18 These divisions continued into 
the Roberts Court era as newly-appointed Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena 
Kagan were similar to their predecessors, Justices David Souter and John Paul 
Stevens, respectively, and, thus, their appointments did not change the balance 
of views on the Court.19 The Roberts Court is regarded as having shifted 
rightward through the appointment of Justice Samuel Alito to replace his more 
moderate predecessor, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor.20 In addition, there are 
clues that Chief Justice Roberts may actually be more conservative than Chief 
 
 14. For example, discretionary decisions by prosecutors about what charges to pursue and 
what sentence to recommend are not dictated by the Supreme Court. Similarly, jurors’ 
discretionary decisions about whether evidence supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt are matters of judgment that are not dictated by Supreme Court rulings. See, e.g., 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & JOYCE A. BAUGH, THE REAL CLARENCE THOMAS: CONFIRMATION 
VERACITY MEETS PERFORMANCE REALITY 85–88 (2000) (describing how discretionary 
decisions by prosecutors and jurors determine outcomes in capital cases). 
 15. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Elisabeth Bumiller, Senate Confirms Roberts as 17th Chief 
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/politics/politicsspe 
cial1/30confirm.html?pagewanted=all. 
 16. Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (July 
24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/us/25roberts.html?pagewanted=all. 
 17. The new appointees were Samuel Alito in 2006, Sonia Sotomayor in 2009, and Elena 
Kagan in 2010. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn In as Justice After Senate Gives Approval, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/01/politics/politicsspecial1/01con 
firm.html; Charlie Savage, Sotomayor Sworn In as New Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/09/us/politics/09sotomayor.html; Peter Baker, Kagan is Sworn 
In as Fourth Woman, and 112th Justice, on the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/us/08kagan.html?gwh=04D1864E437CF3937E6FF4B6B21
DBFC0. 
 18. The Supreme Court’s divisions were illuminated by a notable percentage of 5-to-4 
decisions in criminal justice cases. Christopher E. Smith, The Rehnquist Court and Criminal 
Justice: An Empirical Assessment, 19 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 161, 170 (2003). 
 19. See Lipak, supra note 16 (“But not one of those replacements seems likely to affect the 
fundamental ideological alignment of the [C]ourt. . . . Justices Souter and Stevens, both liberals, 
have been . . . succeeded by liberals.”). 
 20. Id. 
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Justice Rehnquist, and, thus, may contribute in his own way to a rightward 
shift in specific cases.21 However, even if Justices Roberts and Alito are more 
conservative than their immediate predecessors,22 these differences do not 
significantly alter the overall division of conservative and liberal viewpoints on 
the Court, with the conservatives regarded as having a five-member majority.23 
Although the Roberts Court appears to be a continuation of the Rehnquist 
Court, when looking solely at the liberal-conservative division among the 
justices, questions remain about how these justices will address the range of 
issues presented to the Court.24 
The Roberts Court’s decisions affecting erroneous convictions will be 
affected by the individual justices’ attitudes25 and their conceptions of their 
roles and responsibilities.26 Many justices’ attitudes and role conceptions 
become clear as they articulate their views in judicial opinions over their years 
of service on the bench.27 Other justices may not clearly define themselves as 
their positions seem to change depending on the issue facing the Court.28 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Moving Beyond Its Old Divides, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 
2012, at A1 (“It was also not unusual that two-thirds of those decisions divided along ideological 
lines, with Justice Kennedy joining either the [C]ourt’s four more liberal members (Justices 
Kagan, Stephen G. Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor) or its four more 
conservative ones (Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia, and Clarence Thomas). . . . 
Justice Kennedy, a moderate conservative, . . .vote[d] with the conservatives at least 60 percent of 
the time in such ideologically divided cases” in all but two terms since 2000). 
 24. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Rookies on Bench may Recast Liberal Wing: ‘Dynamic’ Duo of 
Kagan and Sotomayor are Adding a Forceful Style of One-Upmanship and Vigor to Supreme 
Court, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 2011, at 9A (“It is not clear whether the forcefulness of Kagan and 
Sotomayor during oral arguments eventually will produce more liberal decisions.”), available at 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20110304/courtarguments04_st.art.htm. 
 25. Social scientists who study judicial decision making regard the attitudes of individual 
Supreme Court justices as key drivers of their decisions. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. 
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ADDITIONAL MODEL 64–73 (1993). 
 26. One important influence over judicial officers’ decisions is their conception of their roles 
and responsibilities according to their beliefs about what judges should and should not do. See 
CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 209–10 (2d ed. 1997). 
 27. For example, Justice Clarence Thomas’ opinions in his twenty-year career on the 
Supreme Court have clearly revealed that he is the justice least likely to recognize the existence 
of constitutional rights for incarcerated offenders, and he does not believe that judges have an 
important role in ensuring that humane conditions exist in prisons. See Christopher E. Smith, 
Rights Behind Bars: The Distinctive Viewpoint of Justice Clarence Thomas, 88 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 829, 838–50 (2011). 
 28. Justice Anthony Kennedy, for example, is a justice who is frequently described as not 
clearly defined because “he frequently winds up in the middle, looking for that elusive 
compromise position that will resolve the most divisive either-or cases.” JAN CRAWFORD 
GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 182 (2007). 
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Because the Roberts Court has so many relatively recent appointees,29 a 
number of its members are yet to define themselves clearly with respect to 
issues related to erroneous convictions. There are arguably two polar 
perspectives30 regarding judicial roles and responsibilities affecting erroneous 
convictions. Each attitude was represented on the Court during the Rehnquist 
era, but it remains to be seen whether and how these attitudes will affect 
majority decisions in the Roberts Court era. 
A. Skepticism About the Judicial Responsibility for Error Correction 
The late Chief Justice William Rehnquist concisely summarized his 
attitude about the judicial responsibility for correcting errors when he said: 
“The Supreme Court of the United States should be reserved . . . for important 
and disputed questions of law, not for individual injustices that might be 
corrected, and should be corrected, in other courts.”31 One unfortunate 
implication from Rehnquist’s statement is that he would not necessarily act to 
correct injustices that should have been corrected elsewhere,32 even though 
cases reach the Supreme Court only after exhausting opportunities for 
consideration—and correction—by lower courts.33 In writing the majority 
opinion in Herrera v. Collins34 concerning a request in the habeas corpus 
process for consideration of newly-discovered evidence of innocence, 
Rehnquist emphasized “the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of 
actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the 
enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence 
 
 29. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 30. The characterization of perspectives as “polar” indicates “that these Justices are least 
likely to agree, not that they always reach consistently opposing conclusions.” Christopher E. 
Smith, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Corrections Law, 32 HAMLINE L. REV. 477, 481 
(2009). 
 31. Interview of William H. Rehnquist in This Honorable Court (PBS television broadcast 
Sept. 12, 1989), quoted in Christopher E. Smith & Avis Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court’s 
Activism and the Risk of Injustice 26 CONN. L. REV. 53, 66 n.63 (1993). 
 32. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411 (1992) (Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the 
majority opinion turning aside a request for consideration of newly-discovered evidence of 
innocence, in part, because he described executive clemency as the final avenue for the correction 
of erroneous convictions). 
 33. Typically, the Supreme Court can only review a state court conviction after it has 
received a final judgment from the highest level of state court in which a decision could be had. 
See, e.g., ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET 18 (1964) (describing the famous case of 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), in which the Supreme Court nationalized the 
requirement of a right to appointed counsel for indigents facing serious criminal charges, and the 
indigent offender was required to pursue his case through the Florida court system before he 
could petition the U.S. Supreme Court to hear his case). 
 34. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 392. 
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would place on the States.”35 Moreover, Rehnquist emphasized that executive 
clemency is the primary final avenue for correction of erroneous convictions.36 
He did not, however, acknowledge that governors seeking re-election or 
aspiring to different electoral offices may, without any regard for the actual 
evidence of innocence, avoid issuing pardons for fear that political opponents 
will use such actions against them in a subsequent election.37 Thus, a judicial 
role orientation of leaving error correction responsibilities to other decision-
makers creates risks that wrongful convictions will go unremedied.38 
On the Roberts Court, Justice Antonin Scalia is the most outspoken 
opponent of judicial intervention to correct erroneous trial outcomes. Justice 
Scalia points to the text of the Constitution to deny the existence of any 
guarantee that defendants are entitled to have an appeals court correct an 
erroneous guilty verdict based on new evidence: “There is no basis in text, 
tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that were enough) for finding in 
the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discovered 
evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction.”39 Justice Scalia is 
quite emphatic in his assertion that there is no constitutional right to be free 
from punishment, including execution, merely because the defendant is 
actually innocent: 
This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a 
convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to 
convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent. Quite to the contrary, we 
have repeatedly left that question unresolved, while expressing considerable 
doubt that any claim based on alleged ‘actual innocence’ is constitutionally 
cognizable.40 
 
 35. Id. at 417. 
 36. Id. at 415. 
 37. For example, when Governor Douglas Wilder of Virginia merely commuted the death 
sentence, but did not pardon Earl Washington in 1994 after DNA tests excluded Washington as 
the rapist in a rape-murder case, the law professor who represented Washington observed, “[i]t is 
a plausible speculation that Wilder’s decision was influenced by his contemplation of a run for 
the U.S. Senate.” Eric Freedman, Earl Washington’s Ordeal, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1089, 1100 
n.91 (2001). 
 38. See, e.g., Melanie Eversley & Larry Copeland, Georgia Proceeds with Troy Davis 
Execution, USA TODAY, Sept. 22, 2011, at 3A, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/story/2011-09-21/troy-davis-georgia-execution/50491648/1; Michael King, Timeline 
of Troy Davis Case, USA TODAY (Sept. 22, 2011, 3:07 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/ 
news/nation/story/2011-09-21/troy-davis-timeline/50498302/1 (describing the grave risk that an 
innocent man was executed after a lack of judicial intervention and denial of a pardon in a case 
when a man was convicted solely on the testimony of witnesses, several of whom later recanted 
their testimony and claimed that the police coerced them into implicating the defendant). 
 39. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 427–28 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 40. Justice Scalia explained his position in a dissent from a denial of certiorari in In re 
Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, Scalia shares Rehnquist’s belief that judicial officers need not take 
action because judicial officers can expect the exercise of executive clemency 
when there is strong evidence of innocence,41 notwithstanding real-world 
examples to the contrary.42 
A component of this perspective seems to be a fatalistic view about the 
prospects of diminishing errors and unfair treatment, as if to say “the system 
can never be perfect, so why bother trying to improve it?”43 Such an attitude 
seemed to be implicit in Scalia’s comment in Herrera v. Collins that, 
I can understand, or at least am accustomed to, the reluctance of the present 
Court to admit publicly that Our Perfect Constitution lets stand any injustice, 
much less the execution of an innocent man who has received, though to no 
avail, all the process that our society has traditionally deemed adequate.44 
It is possible that this attitude reflects prioritizing of values that simply does 
not place correction of injustice at the top of the list. Although Scalia is not 
credited with the most outrageous judicial statements placing the highest value 
on finality over other priorities,45 it is possible that Scalia’s disinclination for 
 
 41. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t is improbable that evidence of 
innocence as convincing as today’s opinion requires would fail to produce an executive pardon.”). 
 42. See Eversley & Copeland, supra note 38. See also David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did 
Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42, 61–62 (noting that the 
Texas Board of Pardons and Parole ignored an expert’s report concluding that the original arson 
investigation had reached erroneous conclusions). 
 43. For example, in a memo circulated among the justices during their deliberations 
concerning McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), Scalia forthrightly declared that he 
considered racial discrimination in the criminal justice process to be ever-present and 
unstoppable, and he subsequently voted to endorse the operation of the capital punishment system 
in Georgia despite recognizing that there was strong statistical evidence demonstrating the 
existence of discrimination. In Scalia’s words in the memo, “it is my view that the unconscious 
operation of irrational sympathies and antipathies, including racial, upon jury decisions and 
(hence) prosecutorial [ones] is real, acknowledged by the [cases] of the court and ineradicable.” 
Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Justice Scalia’s Influence on Criminal Justice, 34 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 535, 549–50 (2003). As described by Professor Dennis Dorin, Scalia “trivialize[ed] 
[racist practices] by saying, in a single-paragraph memo, that they were merely an unavoidable 
and legally unassailable, part of life for African-Americans.” Dennis D. Dorin, Far Right of the 
Mainstream: Racism, Rights, and Remedies From the Perspective of Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
McCleskey Memorandum, 45 MERCER L. REV. 1035, 1077 (1994). 
 44. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 45. For example, Judge Sharon Keller on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals said, with 
respect to post-conviction DNA test results that excluded a prisoner as the rapist in a rape-murder 
for which he had been convicted, “We can’t give new trials to everyone who establishes, after 
conviction, that they might be innocent. . . . We would have no finality in the criminal justice 
system, and finality is important.” Gretel C. Kovach, A Texas Judge, Accused of Misconduct, 
Draws Mixed Opinions on Her Fairness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at A14. State attorneys 
general have made similar arguments when asserting that there is no constitutional rights 
violation if a state executes an innocent person who has been convicted of murder in a fair-but-
inaccurate trial. See Lisa Falkenberg, Innocent on Death Row? Texas Might Listen, HOUSTON 
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concern about correcting injustices reflects an emphasis on finality in criminal 
cases. Such priorities have been detected by analysts, such as in Schriro v. 
Summerlin,46 when it was observed that “Justice Scalia's majority opinion 
privileges finality over justice and makes a virtue out of federal deference to 
unconstitutional state court decisions and laws.”47 Obviously, attitudes and 
priorities favoring finality over accuracy as well as acceptance of mistakes in 
criminal cases can lead justices to refrain from examining cases closely and 
seeking to remedy errors. A major question for the Roberts Court is the extent 
to which other justices share the attitudes articulated by Rehnquist and 
Scalia.48 
B. An Emphasis on Careful Review and Error Correction 
As with the issue of how many Roberts Court justices are skeptical of 
judicial responsibility for error correction, the same question exists with 
respect to the opposing polar perspective: an emphasis on careful review and 
error correction.49 During the Rehnquist Court era and the first years of the 
Roberts era, Justice John Paul Stevens, who retired in 2010,50 stood out as the 
strongest advocate of procedural rights to reduce the risk of erroneous 
convictions,51 including careful post-conviction reviews.52 For example, 
Stevens argued that the Supreme Court’s rules on death-qualified jurors 
created pro-prosecution and pro-capital punishment bias in capital trials, two 
 
CHRON. (Feb. 3, 2009), http://www.chron.com/news/falkenberg/article/Innocent-on-death-row-
Texas-might-listen-1733387.php. 
 46. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2002). 
 47. Marc E. Johnson, Everything Old Is New Again: Justice Scalia’s Activist Originalism in 
Schriro v. Summerlin, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 763, 763 (2005). 
 48. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito generally do not support claims by criminal 
defendants and convicted offenders. However, they have not been on the Court long enough to 
draw firm conclusions about the attitudes underlying their decisions related to erroneous 
conviction cases. Michael A. McCall, Madhavi M. McCall & Christopher E. Smith, Criminal 
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009-2010 Term, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 227, 232 (2010-2011). 
 49. Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan are relatively supportive of claims by defendants 
and convicted offenders, but they have not been on the Court long enough to draw firm 
conclusions about the attitudes underlying their decisions related to erroneous conviction cases. 
Id. 
 50. Joan Biskupic, Obama’s court choice: Consensus or clash?, USA TODAY, Apr. 12, 
2010, at 5A. 
 51. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, The Roles of Justice John Paul Stevens in Criminal 
Justice Cases, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 719, 736–39 (2006) (noting that Justice Stevens was the 
foremost advocate of the adversarial process, the right to counsel, and the right to trial by jury). 
 52. See, e.g., Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Prisoners’ Rights, 17 
TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 83, 102–06 (2007) (Justice Stevens became the lone justice to 
always dissent from Supreme Court imposed prohibitions on filing petitions by prisoners who 
frequently sought to litigate cases pro se). 
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elements that might enhance the risk of improper convictions and sentences.53 
In a speech to the American Bar Association, Stevens complained that the voir 
dire processes in capital jury trials are conducted in a manner so that “jurors 
are likely to assume that their primary task is to determine the penalty for the 
presumptively guilty defendant.”54 Stevens also wrote the leading dissenting 
opinion asserting that there should be a constitutional right for convicted 
offenders to have DNA tests conducted on evidence that has been preserved in 
criminal cases.55 In another example, he also wrote the leading dissenting 
opinion arguing that death row inmates should be entitled to a right to counsel 
for the preparation of habeas corpus petitions.56 
In light of Justice Stevens’ retirement,57 who, if anyone, will emerge as the 
leading voice for careful review of cases to protect against erroneous 
convictions? Justice Sonia Sotomayor is an intriguing possibility as she 
“provided a clue that she may emerge as the Court’s new outspoken leader 
who defends prisoners’ rights.”58 She wrote a strong, solo dissent from a denial 
of certiorari in a case concerning a prisoner who was punished because he 
stopped taking his AIDS medication.59 Although prisoners’ rights cases do not 
raise exactly the same issues as cases concerning erroneous convictions,60 
Sotomayor’s assertiveness in this prisoner’s case may indicate that she 
possesses the empathy and sensitivity to injustice that President Obama 
declared he was seeking in a Supreme Court justice when he selected her for 
nomination.61 
 
 53. Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens and Capital Punishment, 15 BERKELEY 
J. CRIM. L. 205, 247–49 (2010). 
 54. Justice John Paul Stevens, Address at the American Bar Association Thurgood Marshall 
Awards Dinner (Aug. 6, 2005), quoted in Smith, supra note 53, at 247–48. 
 55. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 87–88 
(2009). 
 56. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 15, 20, 29 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 57. Biskupic, supra note 50, at 5A. 
 58. Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L. 
REV. 853, 880 (2011). 
 59. Pitre v. Cain, 354 Fed. Appx. 142 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 8 (2010) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 60. Prisoners’ rights cases may raise a variety of issues from the Bill of Rights, including 
First Amendment protections for free exercise of religion and Eighth Amendment protections 
against cruel and unusual punishments. See JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF 
PRISONERS 99–116, 121–56 (9th ed. 2010). However, erroneous conviction cases often focus on 
new, post-conviction evidence and issues concerning fair judicial processes. See, e.g., Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393, 398, 400, 404–05 (1993) (assertion of actual innocence based on 
newly discovered evidence is not grounds for federal habeas corpus relief). 
 61. Kathryn Abrams, Empathy and Experience in the Sotomayor Hearings, 36 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 263, 263–65 (2010). 
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The ultimate impact of the Roberts Court on issues related to erroneous 
convictions will depend on whether the skeptical perspective emphasizing 
finality, as illustrated by Justice Scalia, continues to hold the upper-hand when 
the nine justices vote on cases.62 The continuation of current trends in the 
Court’s decisions will be affected by retirements and new appointees63 as well 
as by the changing dynamics of open-mindedness, assertiveness, and 
persuasiveness within the justices’ interactions and deliberations.64 
III.  THE ROBERTS COURT: DECISIONS MADE AND DECISIONS NEEDED 
It is important to examine judicial decisions in order to evaluate the 
Roberts Court’s performance—and potential—in addressing issues of 
erroneous convictions. Specific Roberts Court decisions have been 
characterized as “nail[s] in the coffin the Court has been constructing for the 
theoretically ‘innocent.’”65 The Court should reconsider these decisions in 
order to fulfill its proper responsibilities for encouraging accurate judicial 
outcomes. In addition, decisions during previous Court eras should be changed 
in order to reduce current impediments to identifying and remedying erroneous 
criminal convictions.66 
A. Roberts Court Errors In Need of Correction 
Professor Janet Hoeffel has described District Attorney’s Office of the 
Third Judicial District v. Osborne67 as the Roberts Court’s missed 
“opportunity to do the right thing” with respect to one aspect of erroneous 
convictions.68 Osborne was sentenced to serve more than twenty years in 
prison upon conviction for kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault.69 In post-
conviction proceedings, Osborne claimed ineffective assistance of counsel and 
 
 62. For example, the pro-government outcome favored by the skeptical perspective was 
supported by the five conservative justices (Roberts, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito) in 
recent cases related to erroneous convictions such as Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial 
Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 54, 61–62 (2009) and Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 
1355 (2011). 
 63. See Smith, supra note 58, at 856–81 (including a discussion of specific changes in the 
Supreme Court’s composition and the potential impact on corrections law). 
 64. See Biskupic, supra note 24. 
 65. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Roberts Court’s Failed Innocence Project, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
43, 43 (2010). 
 66. See, e.g., Smith & Jones, supra note 31, at 76 (“[T]hese conservative[e] [justices] have 
shown greater concern for improving efficiency than for achieving justice: the new procedural 
rules governing habeas corpus increase the risk that innocent men and women will [be executed] 
for crimes they did not commit.”). 
 67. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 52. 
 68. Hoeffel, supra note 65, at 43. 
 69. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 59. 
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sought to have more discriminating DNA testing applied to evidence from the 
crime scene than the particular scientific test that was actually applied.70 
Alaska denied his request to conduct the DNA tests so Osborne pursued 
litigation to gain access to the evidence for which he would pay the financial 
costs for DNA testing.71 Writing for the five-member majority, Chief Justice 
Roberts rejected the assertion that there is a constitutional right to conduct 
post-conviction DNA tests as part of the right to due process.72 In part, Roberts 
relied on his conclusion that legislatures should sort out the conditions and 
circumstances for post-conviction testing of evidence and that judges should 
exercise judicial restraint in refraining from identifying a new constitutional 
right.73 Roberts expressed fears about detrimental impacts on the criminal 
justice system: “The dilemma is how to harness DNA’s power to prove 
innocence without unnecessarily overthrowing the established system of 
criminal justice.”74 As Professor Hoeffel observed, however, “Chief Justice 
Roberts did not elaborate on how such a disaster would come to pass. 
Recognition of the due process claim requested by Osborne would affect [only] 
a small number of cases. Such an opening could only enhance the public's 
sense that justice was done.”75 Thus, Roberts’ expressed fears of harm to the 
system appear to be exaggerated and, even if true, should not automatically 
outweigh the goal of ensuring that innocent people are not erroneously locked 
away in prison. 
On behalf of the four dissenters, Justice Stevens emphasized the 
importance of both the damage to individual liberty from erroneous conviction 
and the government’s own interest in making sure that the correct individual 
has been punished: 
In sum, an individual’s interest in his physical liberty is one of constitutional 
significance. That interest would be vindicated by providing postconviction 
access to DNA evidence, as would the State’s interest in ensuring that it 
punishes the true perpetrator of a crime. In this case, the State has suggested no 
countervailing interest that justifies its refusal to allow Osborne to test the 
evidence in its possession and has not provided any other nonarbitrary 
explanation for its conduct. Consequently, I am left to conclude that the State’s 
failure to provide Osborne access to the evidence constitutes arbitrary action 
that offends basic principles of due process.76 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 58–60. 
 72. Id. at 72–74. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 62. 
 75. Hoeffel, supra note 65, at 56. 
 76. Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 100 (2009) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Thus, the dominant perspective of skepticism turned aside an opportunity to 
recognize that avoidance of wrongful convictions should be a central concern 
of the justice system rather than, as characterized by Professor Hoeffel, a 
continuation of trends in Supreme Court decisions that “all but severed any 
relationship between a claim of actual innocence and the Constitution.”77 
One effective way to deter misconduct by government officials and 
remedy rights violations that result from such misconduct is to impose civil 
liability on officials through civil litigation processes.78 The use of civil 
liability has been especially important for making police officers more 
knowledgeable, aware, and worried about their actions that would violate 
citizens’ rights.79 Unfortunately, in Connick v. Thompson,80 the Roberts Court 
missed an opportunity to apply civil liability principles against prosecutors in a 
manner that would have created greater pressure to avoid misconduct that leads 
to erroneous convictions.81 In that case, John Thompson was convicted of 
robbery and murder and thereafter sentenced to death.82 Prior to gaining his 
release because of these erroneous convictions, he spent fourteen of his 
eighteen years in prison enduring the isolation of death row and experiencing 
the psychological pressure of several execution dates that approached amid the 
legal challenges to his convictions.83 Thompson’s erroneous conviction was 
caused by prosecutorial misconduct in hiding exculpatory evidence.84 
Prosecutors commit a violation of defendants’ constitutional rights when they 
fail to share exculpatory evidence with the defense attorney.85 He avoided 
execution and gained release solely through the luck of his private investigator 
discovering the prosecutorial misconduct shortly before his scheduled 
execution.86 As described by one commentator, 
[P]rosecutors had failed to turn over evidence that would have cleared him. . . . 
This evidence included the fact that the main informant against him had 
 
 77. Hoeffel, supra note 65, at 43. 
 78. See GEORGE F. COLE, CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH & CHRISTINA DEJONG, THE AMERICAN 
SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 316 (13th ed. 2013). 
 79. CHARLES R. EPP, MAKING RIGHTS REAL: ACTIVISTS, BUREAUCRATS, AND THE 
CREATION OF THE LEGALISTIC STATE 59–114 (2009). 
 80. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 81. As noted in Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, “The prosecutorial concealment . . . is bound to 
be repeated unless municipal agencies bear responsibility” for the withholding of exculpatory 
evidence. Id. at 1370 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 82. Id. at 1355 (majority opinion). 
 83. Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas writes one of the meanest 
Supreme Court decisions ever, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_unusual.html. 
 84. Id. 
 85. The constitutional requirement that prosecutors reveal exculpatory evidence was 
established by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 86. Lithwick, supra note 83. 
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received a reward from the victim’s family, that the eyewitness identification 
done at the time described someone who looked nothing like him, and that a 
blood sample taken from the crime scene did not match Thompson’s blood 
type.87 
In addition, “a junior assistant D.A. on the Thompson case, confessed as he lay 
dying of cancer that he had withheld the crime lab test results and removed a 
blood sample from the evidence room. The prosecutor to whom [he] confessed 
said nothing about this for another five years.”88 
Thompson gained a new trial as a result of the revelations about the hidden 
evidence and he was quickly acquitted by the jury in the second trial.89 He sued 
the prosecutor, Connick, for causing the rights violation and unjust lengthy 
prison sentence by failing to train the assistant prosecutors about their 
responsibilities for revealing exculpatory evidence.90 A jury awarded $14 
million to Thompson for the harm that he suffered, but the conservative five-
member majority on the Supreme Court erased the award by declaring that he 
could not sue the prosecutor, even though the prosecutor admitted to failing to 
train his assistant prosecutors.91 On behalf of the majority, Justice Clarence 
Thomas said, among other things, that assistant prosecutors can be presumed to 
have learned what they need to know in law school, notwithstanding their 
evident ignorance and misconduct in hiding evidence in Thompson’s case.92 In 
his effort to maximize the immunity from civil liability enjoyed by 
prosecutors, Justice Thomas “willfully ignor[ed] the entire trial record . . . [to] 
reduce the entire constitutional question to a single misdeed by a single bad 
actor [i.e., one assistant prosecutor].”93 In reality, as Justice Ginsburg presented 
in her dissenting opinion, no fewer than five prosecutors were involved in 
manipulating the evidence or hiding information in order to convict Thompson 
of crimes that he did not commit.94 
The traditional principle of immunizing prosecutors from most civil 
lawsuits regarding their official actions has value for protecting the 
independence of prosecutors’ decision making and sparing them from being 
bogged down defending themselves against frivolous lawsuits filed by 
vengeful criminal offenders.95 However, granting absolute immunity that 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1357 (2011). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1377 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 92. Id. at 1361 (majority opinion). 
 93. Lithwick, supra note 83. 
 94. Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1384 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 95. Prosecutors have traditionally been among the small categories of decision makers, 
including legislators, jurors, judges, and presidents, who enjoy absolute immunity “because their 
actions are protected in the interest of public policy, so long as the actions are taken as part of 
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includes protection for intentional misconduct that leads an innocent person to 
face execution carries the principle too far. It erases the needed pressures and 
incentives for prosecutors to follow proper rules and respect individuals’ 
rights.96 As noted by Professor Susan Bandes, “letting Connick's office off the 
hook does violence to the deterrent aims of the statute [creating liability for 
constitutional rights violations] and removes any incentive for prosecutors to 
institute rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of violating 
rights.”97 
Prosecutors continue to feel pressures from their superiors98 and from 
society99 to make sure that they can make a conviction stick. On the other 
hand, however, this pressure to gain convictions may actually create incentives 
to violate rules and cover-up rule violations rather than follow the rules of 
law.100 Thus, civil liability for prosecutors who commit misconduct could have 
significant value as a factor that helps to counteract processes that lead to 
erroneous convictions. 
B. Errors From Prior Court Eras 
The Roberts Court has the authority to overturn prior Supreme Court 
decisions that a majority of contemporary justices conclude were wrongly 
decided.101 While certain Supreme Court justices have expressed reluctance 
about actively seeking issues that might be reconsidered,102 the Roberts Court 
 
their official duties.” CLAIR A. CRIPE & MICHAEL G. PEARLMAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT 312 (2005). 
 96. As officials who are immune from lawsuits and who have a variety of motives and 
pressures in their jobs, prosecutors are susceptible to making decisions and taking actions that 
violate both ethics and law. Bennett L. Gershman, Why Prosectors Misbehave, in COURTS AND 
JUSTICE: A READER 328 (G. Larry Mays & Peter R. Gregware eds., 2009). 
 97. Susan A. Bandes, The Lone Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other 
Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 734 (2011). 
 98. E.g., id. at 730 (“And indeed it is commonplace that obtaining convictions tends to be 
the key to prosecutorial advancement.”). 
 99. See SMITH, supra note 26, at 102 (“Prosecutors’ decisions are normally influenced by 
their desire to maintain cooperative relationships with other actors in the criminal justice system 
or to preserve a positive image in the eyes of voters and political elites.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Ephraim Unell, A Right Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil Liability of 
Prosecutors in the Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 959 (2011) 
(“Prosecutors concerned about job security and promotion, particularly but not exclusively in 
jurisdictions where prosecutors are elected, face pressure to increase conviction rates. The 
prevalence of a ‘win at all costs’ culture in prosecutorial offices can erode individual prosecutors’ 
internal sense of norms and ethical behavior.”). 
 101. CHRISTOPHER P. BANKS & DAVID M. O’BRIEN, COURTS AND JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 
308 (2008). 
 102. See Michael Herz, Justice Byron White and the Argument That the Greater Includes the 
Lesser, 1994 BYU L. REV. 227, 233 n.23 (“[M]ore than most Justices he would accept rulings 
from which he had dissented as binding precedent.”). 
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justices have not been shy about accepting for reconsideration issues that can 
lead to the reversal of precedents from prior Court eras.103 The protection of 
innocent people from wrongful convictions is supremely important as a matter 
of justice, so the Roberts Court should consider every opportunity to clear 
away precedents that contribute to wrongful convictions. 
One such precedent was produced in the case of Carlisle v. United 
States.104 Defendant Charles Carlisle stood trial on a federal marijuana 
charge.105 Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), Carlisle filed a 
motion for a judgment of acquittal following the jury’s return of a guilty 
verdict.106 Because the district court granted the motion despite the fact that it 
was filed one day past the seven-day time limit detailed in Rule 29(c), the 
Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals reversed and ordered reinstatement of the 
original guilty verdict.107 The appellate court held that an untimely motion for 
a judgment of acquittal shall not be granted under the jurisdiction of a district 
court.108 Subsequently, Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion for the 
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of the Appeals by enforcing 
the statutory filing deadline as a limitation on a trial judge’s authority.109 
 
 103. For example, in the middle of oral arguments in Montejo v. Louisana, 556 U.S. 778 
(2009), a case concerning police questioning of charged defendants outside of the presence of 
counsel, “Justice Alito suddenly made the out-of-the-blue suggestion that the Court should 
consider overruling [Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)], despite the fact that this 
prospect had not been raised, briefed, or argued by the parties as an issue in the case.” 
Christopher E. Smith, Justice John Paul Stevens: Staunch Defender of Miranda Rights, 60 
DEPAUL L. REV. 99, 135 (2010). Ultimately, they reversed the prior precedent. Id. In another 
example, during the 2012 Term, the Roberts Court accepted for hearing a challenge to race-based 
affirmative action programs in higher education admissions (Fisher v. University of Texas, No. 
11-345), which clearly constituted a reconsideration of the Rehnquist Court’s prior decision 
endorsing certain practices in the University of Michigan case of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306 (2003). Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Faces Weighty Cases and a New Dynamic, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/30/us/supreme-court-faces-crucial-cases-in-
new-session.html? pagewanted=all&gwh=B695CCEBB2A28D41DAB80746DEEF8299. Former 
New York Times reporter, Linda Greenhouse, who specialized in covering the Supreme Court, 
asserted that, with respect to the University of Texas affirmative action case, “the Supreme 
Court’s purely discretionary decision last February to grant review in this case was an aggressive 
act of agenda setting. . . . So the logical inference is that the current majority—Justice Samuel A. 
Alito Jr. having replaced Justice O’Connor—doesn’t like the precedent.” Linda Greenhouse, 
History Lessons, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2012, 8:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2012/10/03/history-lessons/. 
 104. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416 (1996). 
 105. Id. at 418. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 419. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 433. 
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The essential flaws and detrimental consequence of the majority’s decision 
were made clear in a dissenting opinion by Justice John Paul Stevens, joined 
by Justice Anthony Kennedy.110 As summarized by Stevens, “The majority 
nevertheless maintains that the Rule must be read to require judges, in some 
instances, to enter judgments of conviction against defendants they know to be 
innocent.”111 In establishing this precedent, the majority clearly elevated the 
value of adhering to strict procedural rules above the more important value of 
ensuring that criminal punishment is reserved for those defendants whose guilt 
is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.112 Is slavish adherence to a filing 
deadline really more important than keeping an innocent person from being 
sent to prison? Here the risk of erroneous conviction seemed particularly 
undervalued because the procedural violation was especially minor, as the 
motion was only one day late in failing to meet a short seven-day deadline.113 
Justice Stevens emphasized the inherent power of the federal court: 
There is a “power ‘inherent in every court of justice so long as it retains 
control of the subject matter and of the parties, to correct that which has been 
wrongfully done by virtue of its process.’” United States v. Morgan, 307 U. S., 
at 197. Of course, that power does not survive after the court’s jurisdiction of 
the subject matter has expired. It is surely sufficient, however, to enable the 
judge to refuse to impose sentence on a defendant when the record does not 
contain evidence of guilt.114 
Justice Stevens characterized the issue in the case differently than the 
articulation advanced in the majority’s analysis: 
The question in this case, therefore, is not whether Rule 29 . . . authorizes the 
court to grant an untimely motion for a judgment of acquittal; . . . Rather, the 
question is whether that Rule withdraws the court’s pre-existing authority to 
refrain from entering judgment of conviction against a defendant whom it 
knows to be legally innocent.”115 
To Stevens and Kennedy, the statute was silent about this inherent 
power,116 and, therefore, the majority relied on an erroneous negative inference 
to claim that the statutory filing deadline intended to indicate that judges 
 
 110. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 436 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 111. Id. at 446. 
 112. See supra notes 25–48 and accompanying text regarding differing values and attitudes 
driving decisions concerning wrongful convictions. 
 113. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 418. 
 114. Id. at 453 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 437 (emphasis in original). 
 116. See id. at 443 (“Therefore, absent some express indication that Congress intended to 
withdraw the power that implicitly attends its initial grant of jurisdiction, a district court acts well 
within its discretion when it sets aside a jury verdict and acquits a defendant because the 
prosecution failed to prove its case.”). 
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lacked power outside of the statute to counteract erroneous jury decisions.117 
The Stevens dissent made its point most strongly by referring to trial judges’ 
authority to prevent a case from going to a jury when a prosecutor has failed to 
carry the burden of proof regarding criminal guilt: 
It would be most strange to conclude that this [inherent] authority, which 
enables a district court to keep a case from the jury altogether when the 
Government fails to prove its case, does not permit the same court to revise a 
guilty verdict that the jury returns despite the Government’s insufficient 
proof.118 
Unfortunately, this case presented the Court with an opportunity to 
consider the fate of a man whose guilt was not clearly proven, yet the majority 
opinion emphasized the lapsed filing deadline as the defining factor against 
granting a motion for acquittal.119 Because this precedent undervalues the 
importance of using available mechanisms—including the wisdom and 
judgment of experienced judges120—to guard against wrongful convictions, the 
Supreme Court should look for an opportunity to revisit and overrule this 
precedent. 
Another case the Roberts Court should both revisit and overturn is Arizona 
v. Youngblood,121 as it also aided in the Court’s contributions to wrongful 
convictions. On October 29, 1983, a middle-aged man abducted, kidnapped, 
confined, molested, and sodomized a ten-year-old boy after the boy left an 
evening church service.122 Sadly, the attack lasted nearly ninety minutes after 
which time the young boy was released from captivity.123 The assailant 
threatened to kill the boy if the young victim spoke with the police.124 
Subsequently, the child returned home and his mother drove him to a hospital 
where a sexual assault kit collection procedure was performed for the purpose 
of gathering potential evidence, including semen samples, hair, blood, and 
saliva.125 
After examining the slides containing biological evidence, the crime lab 
investigator concluded that a sexual assault occurred, but no further tests were 
 
 117. Id. at 421–26 (majority opinion). 
 118. Id. at 442 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 119. See Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 416. 
 120. Judges typically have expertise with evaluating evidence from past experience as 
attorneys as well as experience on the bench while, by contrast, jurors have a single encounter 
with the courtroom process and their interactions with other jurors, thereby limiting their abilities 
as effective fact-finders and careful determiners of standards of proof. See Saul M. Kassin, The 
American Jury: Handicapped in the Pursuit of Justice, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 687 (1990). 
 121. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). 
 122. Id. at 52. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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carried out that might have helped to either identify or exonerate suspects.126 
The boy’s clothing, which contained stains from bodily fluids, was not 
refrigerated to prevent the biological materials from degrading.127 Meanwhile, 
the victim identified a suspect from a photographic lineup and Larry 
Youngblood was placed into police custody.128 When the clothing and other 
samples were actually tested more than a year later in order to provide proof 
linking the suspect to the evidence, the crime lab scientists were unable to 
successfully isolate a blood-type classification or any other factor useful for 
identification from the biological material.129 Youngblood claimed that the boy 
had made a mistaken identification of him as the assailant, but he was 
convicted of the crime.130 He appealed by alleging that proper preservation and 
timely testing of the biological evidence would have exonerated him.131 The 
Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the conviction by finding a violation of due 
process.132 The Arizona court stated that “when identity is an issue at trial and 
the police permit the destruction of evidence that could eliminate the defendant 
as the perpetrator, such loss is material to the defense and is a denial of due 
process.”133 
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion, which stated that 
the police were not proven to have acted in “bad faith” while conducting their 
investigation, and the police carry no constitutional duty to perform any 
particular tests.134 Therefore, the police did not violate the Due Process 
Clause.135 However, Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices 
Marshall and Brennan, argued that “[t]he Constitution requires that criminal 
defendants be provided with a fair trial, not merely a ‘good faith’ try at a fair 
trial.”136 In other words, proof of “bad faith” by the police should not be 
required to establish that a defendant has been deprived of a fair trial because, 
as was apparently the case for Youngblood, “police ineptitude . . . [can] den[y] 
the opportunity to present a full defense” and thereby violate the right to due 
process.137 
Police should bear the responsibility for preserving evidence in their 
possession in order to permit future testing. Fulfillment of this responsibility is 
 
 126. Id. at 53. 
 127. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 53. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 54. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 54–55. 
 133. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 54. 
 134. Id. at 58. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 61 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 137. Id. 
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essential because of the many cases in which scientific testing techniques have 
improved over the years so that, for example, convictions based on blood types 
have been overturned years later when newly-developed DNA testing 
techniques freed wrongly-convicted prisoners through exclusion of individuals 
among those who share a blood type.138 In all of these cases, if police had 
permitted the destruction, degradation, or loss of biological evidence, whether 
done intentionally or negligently, then innocent people would have remained in 
prison, including wrongly-convicted individuals serving life sentences.139 A 
legal duty to preserve evidence certainly requires the expenditure of scarce law 
enforcement resources,140 but to do otherwise would represent the abdication 
of a greater responsibility to preserve individual liberty and guard against 
wrongful convictions.141 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The tragic consequences of insufficient emphasis on guarding against 
wrongful convictions are easy to see when innocent people serve long prison 
 
 138. For examples of exonerations based on scientific testing techniques that were not 
available at the time of conviction, see New DNA Testing Frees Convicted Colorado Rapist, 
Killer, NBC NEWS (Apr. 30, 2012, 4:55 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/04/30/ 
11466476-new-dna-testing-frees-convicted-colorado-rapist-killer?lite; Molly Hennessey-Fisk, 
Texan Wrongly Convicted of Rape Freed after 24 Years in Prison, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/25/nation/la-na-nn-rape-texas-exonerated-20120824; 
Convicted Texas Man Cleared by DNA Test After 30 Years in Prison, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 4, 
2011), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/jan-june11/texascase_01-04.html; DNA Tests Free 
Convicted Rapist, CBS NEWS (Feb. 11, 2009, 8:54 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_ 
162-532165.html. 
 139. See New DNA Testing Frees Convicted Colorado Rapist, Killer, supra note 138. 
 140. Kevin Johnson, Storage of Evidence Key to Exonerations, USA TODAY, Mar. 28, 2011, 
at 13A, available at http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20110328/crimelab 
28_st.art.htm. 
 141. Justice John Paul Stevens described the importance of individual liberty as something 
that predated the Constitution and a value that was neither created by nor extinguished by law: 
  But neither the Bill of Rights nor the laws of sovereign States create the liberty 
which the Due Process Clause protects. The relevant constitutional provisions are 
limitations on the power of the sovereign to infringe on the liberty of the citizen. The 
relevant state laws either create property rights, or they curtail the freedom of the citizen 
who must live in an ordered society. Of course, law is essential to the exercise and 
enjoyment of individual liberty in a complex society. But it is not the source of liberty, 
and surely not the exclusive source. 
  I had thought it self-evident that all men were endowed by their Creator with liberty 
as one of the cardinal unalienable rights. It is that basic freedom which the Due Process 
Clause protects, rather than the particular rights or privileges conferred by specific laws or 
regulations. 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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sentences.142 Larry Youngblood, the man convicted of rape, whose case was 
turned aside by the Supreme Court in 1988, later had a stroke of luck when a 
small swab of biological evidence was found and tested using new DNA 
techniques in 2001.143 The tests proved that Youngblood was innocent, just as 
he had claimed all along.144 If not for the fortunate discovery years later, 
Youngblood would have had no hope of gaining exoneration. Other prisoners 
who are deprived of opportunities to test evidence cannot count on enjoying 
similar luck. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s role in facilitating such injustices 
merely creates opportunities for additional people to be affected, such as the 
141 cases in Colorado in which a Denver Post investigation found that police 
and prosecutors had destroyed evidence that prisoners sought to have tested.145 
Included among these cases was one in which police, in violation of their own 
department’s policies and a court order to test the evidence, tossed into a 
dumpster DNA evidence labeled “DO NOT DESTROY” and thereby 
prevented a prisoner from attempting to prove his innocence.146 As nationally-
known criminal defense attorney Abe Hutt said about his client’s case, you 
should not have to 
scream about your innocence from a [prison] cell for 10 years and finally get 
the money together to have this stuff tested only to have so many people at the 
police department be careless, negligent, bad faith, reckless, whatever you 
want to call it, and thereby destroy forever your ability to prove your 
innocence and then have a court look at you and say, well, tough, that’s kind of 
the way it goes.147 
Police officials claimed that the evidence was destroyed through 
“miscommunication”, so a Colorado judge ruled that they were merely 
negligent and not acting in “bad faith.”148 Thus, the possibly-innocent prisoner 
continued to languish in prison with his avenue for exoneration eliminated.149 
As Professor Peter Neufeld has noted, “[i]n law school, we have been 
taught that, absent bad faith, the destruction of critical evidence will not be 
deemed prejudicial. As a result, there has been no requirement that law 
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enforcement agencies use due diligence to preserve evidence.”150 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court bears at least partial responsibility for many 
injustices resulting from the precedents that it has established that provide 
insufficient protection against erroneous convictions. Moreover, as the 300th 
innocent person was freed from prison through subsequent DNA testing in 
2012151 and hundreds of others were exonerated by other means since 1989,152 
evidence accumulates indicating that the problem of wrongful convictions is 
more acute than people realized—with error rates for some crimes potentially 
as high as fifteen percent.153 
The Supreme Court does not bear sole responsibility for guarding against 
the risks of wrongful convictions. State legislatures can craft laws that mandate 
evidence preservation, opportunities for scientific testing, and reform of 
lineups and other procedures that lead to mistaken identifications.154 
Prosecutors can proactively facilitate the reexamination of evidence, as 
demonstrated by the model program in Dallas, Texas,155 rather than resisting 
legitimate efforts to determine if someone was wrongfully convicted.156 Yet, 
the Supreme Court plays an important role and it can do more to advance the 
accuracy of criminal case outcomes. As indicated by the discussion in this 
article, the Roberts Court has made decisions concerning DNA testing and 
prosecutorial misconduct that enhance rather than diminish the risk of 
wrongful convictions.157 The justices could use their authority to undo the 
harm caused by these precedents as well as correct errors in prior precedents 
that enhance the risk of wrongful convictions by, for example, needlessly 
limiting trial judges’ authority to enter “not guilty” verdicts and failing to 
prevent the destruction of testable evidence.158 
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The Supreme Court’s tolerance of legal doctrines that enhance the risk of 
error reflects the individual justices’ interpretive approaches, values, and 
priorities.159 Thus, progress on the needed refinement of legal doctrines—and 
the advancement of justice for wrongly-convicted individuals—will likely 
depend on changes in the Supreme Court’s composition. With four 
septuagenarians serving on the Roberts Court at the start of its 2012 term,160 
compositional changes are likely on the horizon, and the impact of those 
changes on doctrinal developments depends largely on the timing of those 
changes, the identities of the departing justices, and the orientation of the 
president who appoints replacements.161 Ideally, it should not take a change in 
the Court’s composition to find majority support for placing a high priority on 
preventing erroneous convictions. Unfortunately, however, that is likely the 
situation that we face. 
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